My Ssec Capstone Project G2 STC 2/2018 COMMANDANTS PAPER THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ROBUST PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS CASES OF EAST TIMOR AND DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

G2 STC 2/2018 COMMANDANTS PAPER THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ROBUST PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS CASES OF EAST TIMOR AND DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

G2 STC 2/2018 COMMANDANTS PAPER THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ROBUST PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS CASES OF EAST TIMOR AND DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (1st DRAFT) Ref A. MAF JP 0.01 (2012) Malaysian armed forces staff manual (service writing) INTRODUCTION 1. Peacekeeping has been one of the main conflict management tools used by the international community to restore or safeguard peace and security. Since 1948, the United Nations has established 70 peace operations and has substantially evolved, adopting approaches to peace that extend beyond purely military concerns. Indeed, the promises of peacekeeping as effective instrument of conflict reduction may, to some extent, explain the evolution toward multidimensional missions and the unprecedented number of peacekeepers deployed in the last decade. 2. The complex peacekeeping operation by the United Nations (UN) to contain the armed conflict and political violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been one of the largest and most expensive missions in the UN history. Since 1999, the peacekeeping effort in the DRC has cost almost 18 billion and currently comprises of 17,000 military personnel, 1,500 police officers, and 3,500 civilians. 3. Starting from 1600s when the Portuguese invaded Timor and set up trading post and used the island as source of sandalwood, till 1975- December when Indonesia invaded, using its fight against communism as a pretext. and annexed it as a territory and 27th province, to 1999October- when UN first Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established, the East Timor has seen a lot of politico social turmoil. Yet starting from 1999 till 2012 the 5 main UN sequential peacekeeping missions or efforts can rightly be phrased as success story. Keeping all these factors in mind the robustness of UN peace keeping operations demands a close analysis. AIM 5. The aim of this paper is to discuss the effectiveness of robust peace keeping operations with reference to the case study of East Timor and DRC. DISCUSSION 6. Background of UNPKO. United Nations Peacekeeping began in 1948 when the Security Council authorized the deployment of UN military observers to the Middle East. Since then, more than HYPERLINK https//peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/peacekeeping/en/operationslist.pdf t _blank 70peacekeeping operationshave been deployed by the UN. Over the years, hundreds of thousands of military personnel, as well as tens of thousands of UN police and other civilians from more than HYPERLINK https//peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors 120 countrieshave participated in UN peacekeeping operations. More than HYPERLINK https//peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities 3,000 UN peacekeepers from some 120 countries have diedwhile serving under the UN flag. The Early Years. UN Peacekeeping was born at a time when Cold War rivalries frequently paralyzed the Security Council. Peacekeeping was primarily limited to maintaining ceasefires and stabilizing situations on the ground, providing crucial support for political efforts to resolve conflict by peaceful means. Figure,1. UN Photo/UNEF b. The first two peacekeeping operations deployed by the UN were the HYPERLINK https//peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/untso UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)and the HYPERLINK https//peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unmogip UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). c. The Post-Cold War Surge. With the end of the Cold War, the strategic context for UN Peacekeeping changed dramatically. Figure,2.UN Photo/Ky Chung The UN shifted and expanded its field operations from traditional missions involving generally observational tasks performed by military personnel to complex multidimensional enterprises. d. Towards the 21st century New operations, new challenges. At the turn of the century, the UN undertook a major exercise to examine the challenges to peacekeeping in the 1990s and introducing HYPERLINK https//peacekeeping.un.org/en/reforming-peacekeeping reform. The aim was to strengthen our capacity to effectively manage and sustain field operations. With a greater understanding of the limits and potential of UN Peacekeeping, the UN was asked to perform even more complex tasks. This started in 1999 when the UN served as the administrator of both Kosovo in the former Yugoslavia. e. The present. Today, a little more than 110,000 military, police and civilian staff currently serve in 14 peacekeeping missions, representing a decrease in both personnel and peacekeeping missions, as a result of peaceful transitions and the rebuilding of functioning states. 7. Definition of an Effective Peace Keeping Operation. Defining peace, theoretically and empirically, has been a perennial issue for scholars of international relations and peace studies. The concept of negative peace, or the absence of war, has been challenged by differing perspectives on positive peace, including concepts such as participatory peace to bottom-up peace .The operationalization of conflict has also been defined according to different thresholds, specifying different targets of violence, and referring to temporal and within-country variation. Hence, the definition of the effectiveness of peace operations is vigorously debated in the peacekeeping literature, and it has only become more relevant as the field has adopted systematic empirical assessments of mission performance. Since its inception in the early 1990s, the so-called second wave of peacekeeping studies struggled to define and measure success .In 1988, Paul Diehl published what may be one of the first studies on peacekeeping effectiveness that moves beyond the descriptive approach of the first wave of peacekeeping studies. The core and main criterion for peacekeeping success, according to Diehl, depends on the capacity of the mission to limit armed conflict and prevent its renewal. A secondary criterion concerns the missions ability to foster peaceful settlement. . As per the UNs definition there are three basic principles that continue to set UN peacekeeping operations apart as a tool for maintaining international peace and security. These three principles are inter-related and mutually reinforcing Consent of the parties. Impartiality. Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. By amalgamating these two different difinations the criteria of defining the effective peace keeping is set for this service writing. 8. A Broad Over View of Cruz Report. 2017 saw the highest number of peacekeeper fatalities through violent acts in over two decades, with 56 peacekeepers killed. In an effort to reverse this trend and improve the safety and security of UN peacekeepers, the Secretary-General in November 2017 appointed Lieutenant General (Retired) Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz (Brazil) to carry out an in-depth review of peacekeeping fatalities and injuries due to hostile acts.9. The Report aims to identify why the UN has had so many casualties caused by acts of violence in recent years and what should be done to reduce these casualties. In the course of the Review, the team visited UN peacekeeping operations in the DRC, Central African Republic, Mali and South Sudan, accessed relevant internal UN data and conducted 160 interviews to inform their work. The Report does not address the issue of mandates, but instead confines its conclusions to operational issues in MINUSMA, MONUSCO, MINUSCA, UNAMID and UNMISS.10. The Report, which was submitted to the Secretary-General, states that with the influx of armed groups, extremists, organized crime, and other criminal elements and threats, the UN flag no longer offers natural protection to peacekeepers. The Review Team identified four broad areas where the United Nations and Member States must take actions to reduce fatalities.These include- Changing mindsets so that personnel are aware of the risks and empowered to take the initiative to deter, prevent, and respond to attacks Improving capacities so that the mission and personnel are equipped and trained to operate in high-threat environments Achieving a threat sensitive mission footprint that is aligned with mission mandates and limits the exposure of the mission to threat Enhancing accountability to ensure that those able to take actions to prevent fatalities and injuries live up to their responsibilities. 12. Case of East Timor. The1999 East Timorese crisisbegan with attacks by anti-independence militants on civilians, and expanded to general violence throughout the country, centered in the capital HYPERLINK https//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dili o Dili Dili. The violence erupted after a majority of eligible HYPERLINK https//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_Timor o East Timor East imoresevoters HYPERLINK https//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_Timor_Special_Autonomy_Referendum o East Timor Special Autonomy Referendum chose independencefrom HYPERLINK https//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesia o Indonesia Indonesia. Some 1,400 civilians are believed to have died. A UN-authorized force ( HYPERLINK https//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/INTERFET o INTERFET INTERFET) consisting mainly of HYPERLINK https//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australian_Defence_Force o Australian Defence Force Australian Defence Forcepersonnel was deployed to East Timor to establish and maintain peace. a. UNs Peace Keeping Missions and their Role. The United Nations General Assembly placed East Timor on the international agenda in 1960, when it added the territory to its list of Non-Self-Governing Territories. At that time, East Timor was administered by Portugal. 14 years later, in 1974, Portugal sought to establish a provisional government and a popular assembly that would determine the status of East Timor. Civil war broke out between those who favoured independence and those who advocated integration with Indonesia. Unable to control the situation, Portugal withdrew. Indonesia intervened militarily and integrated East Timor as its 27th province in 1976. The United Nations never recognized this integration, and both the Security Council and the General Assembly called for Indonesias withdrawal.b. In June 1998, Indonesia proposed a limited autonomy for East Timor within Indonesia. In light of this proposal, the talks made rapid progress and resulted in a set of agreements between Indonesia and Portugal, signed in New York on 5 May 1999. c. UNAMET and the Popular Consultation. To carry out the consultation, the Security Council, by HYPERLINK http//daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/GetOpenDSs/res/1246(1999)LangE resolution 1246(1999), authorized the establishment of the HYPERLINK https//peacekeeping.un.org/peace/etimor99/etimor.htm United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET)on 11 June 1999. On 30 August 1999, some 98 per cent of registered East Timorese voters went to the polls deciding by a margin of 21.5 per cent to 78.5 per cent to reject the proposed autonomy and begin a process of transition towards independence. Following the announcement of the result, pro-integration militias, at times with the support of elements of the Indonesian security forces, launched a campaign of violence, looting and arson throughout the entire territory. On 12 September 1999, the Government of Indonesia agreed to accept the offer of assistance from the international community. The Security Council then authorized ( HYPERLINK http//daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/GetOpenDSs/res/1264(1999)LangE S/RES/1264) the multinational force (INTERFET) under a unified command structure headed by a Member State (Australia) to restore peace and security in East Timor. d. UNTAET and Transition to Independence. On 19 October 1999, the Indonesian Peoples Consultative Assembly formally recognized the result of the consultation. Shortly thereafter, on 25 October, the United Nations Security Council, by HYPERLINK http//daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/GetOpenDSs/res/1272(1999)LangE resolution 1272 (1999), established the HYPERLINK https//peacekeeping.un.org/peace/etimor/etimor.htm United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)as an integrated, multidimensional peacekeeping operation fully responsible for the administration of East Timor during its transition to independence. In February 2000, marking the complete deployment of UNTAET, command of military operations was transferred from INTERFET to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force.. On 30 August 2001, two years after the Popular Consultation, more than 91 per cent of East Timors eligible voters went to the polls again this time to elect an 88-member Constituent Assembly tasked with writing and adopting a new Constitution and establishing the framework for future elections and a transition to full independence. e. UNMISET and Post-independence Period. UNMISET and Post-independence Period UN involvement in Timor-Leste continued after its independence in May 2002 to ensure the security and stability of the nascent State. A new mission, known as the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), was set up by HYPERLINK http//daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/GetOpenDSs/res/1410(2002)LangE resolution 1410 (2002)unanimously adopted by the Security Council on 17 May 2002. The Mission was established with the following mandate to provide assistance to core administrative structures critical to the viability and political stability of East Timor to provide interim law enforcement and public Security and to assist in developing the East Timor Police Service (ETPS) and contribute to the maintenance of the new countrys external and internal security. Over the course of next two years, UNMISET had gradually handed over its executive authority for external and internal security to the Government of Timor-Leste.The mandate of UNMISET was completed in May 2005 and a successor UN political missionthe United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL)was established on 20 May 2005. UNOTIL was scheduled to end its mandate in May 2006, and the Security Council had already received the Secretary-Generals recommendations for the post-UNOTIL period. However, a series of events culminating in a political, humanitarian and security crisis of major dimensions led the Council to prolong UNOTILs mandate and ultimately in August 2006 to establish a new mission HYPERLINK https//peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unmit/index.html the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). The new UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), a one-year follow-on mission, remained in the country until 2012. 13. Case of Democratic Republic Of Congo (DRC). The conflict of DRC will be discussed in detail as under- a. Background. The DRC, formerly known as Zaire, became independent on 30 June 1960 after being colonized by Belgium. However, in the years that followed, the country has been entangled in violence not only resulted from internal disagreements among the political elites in the country, but also from strong animosity among various groups, particularly between the two ethnics, Hutus and Tutsis from the neighboring country, Rwanda. The resentment among them gradually built up when Rwanda gained independence in 1962 and the Hutus led the Rwandan government. In 1994, approximately 500,000 to 1,000,000 Rwandans, mostly of Tutsi population and pro-peace Hutus, were killed during the 100-day period from 7 April to mid-July 1994 by the Hutumajority government. In response, the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) overthrew the Rwandan Hutu government forcing an estimated 2 million Hutu refugees fled to refugee camps in neighboring countries, particularly in eastern Zaire. When Kabila gained control of the capital, he continued to face substantial obstacles in restoring the order in the country. Besides political jostling among various groups to gain power and an enormous external debt, the conspicuous Rwandan presence in the capital also irritated many Congolese. This resulted in Second War Congo from 1998 to 2003 pitted Congolese government forces, supported byAngola,Namibia, andZimbabwe, against rebels and soldiers backed by Uganda and Rwanda who were trying to dominate the eastern provinces. A peace agreement was signed in 2002 by the warring parties that finally saw Rwandas and Ugandas withdrawal from the Congo. TheTransitional Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congowas set up in 2003 to transform the country into a government based upon aconstitutionagreed on by consensus. However, violence continued in many regions of the country, especially in the eastern Congo. b. UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATION MONUC. The UN peacekeeping mission was established in the Congo following the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999 between the DRC and five regional States (Angola, Namibia,Rwanda,Uganda andZimbabwe) in accordance to theUnited Nations Security Councilin resolutions1279(1999) and 1291 (2000) of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The peacekeeping force was originally known as MONUC, an acronym of its French nameMission de lOrganisation des Nations Unies en Rpublique dmocratique du Congo and was set up to observe the ceasefire and disengagement of forces by the warring factions involved in the Second Congo War and maintain liaison with all parties to the Ceasefire Agreement. In 2003, a MONUC operation called Artemis led by the French forces was launched and successfully completed its stabilization mission in three weeks. It then passed responsibility for regional security back to MONUC, but ongoing violence prompted the UN to request additional international assistance. With this call, India announced its involvement as did Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Morocco bringing the number of MONUC peacekeepers up to 16,000 in 2005 for supervision of the 2006 elections including the deployment of aEuropean Unionforce to support MONUC during the period. c. MONUSCO. The UN did not prolong MONUCs initial mandate, scheduled to end in 2008. Instead, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1925 to establish the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in 2010 to take over the peacekeeping mission from MONUC. The new mission has been authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate relating, among other things, to the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence and to support the DRC government in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts. Today, MONUSCO is the biggest and costliest UN mission with about 22,400 people, including nearly 17,000 soldiers and over 1,350 police. More than 30 nations have contributed military and police personnel to support the peacekeeping operations. However, despite its presence in Eastern Congo, MONUSCO has been unable to broker an effective peace process to deal with the remaining70 armed groupsin the region or to play a critical role in bringing an end to the political turmoil in the country. ANALYSIS 13. How to ascertain Effectivness of a UNPKO. Fol 4 principles can be used to gauge the effectivness of any peacekeeping operation Consent of the parties. Impartiality. Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. Resolution of the Issue at hand. a. Consent of the parties. UN peacekeeping operations are deployed with the consent of the main parties to the conflict. This requires a commitment by the parties to a political process. Their acceptance of a peacekeeping operation provides the UN with the necessary freedom of action, both political and physical, to carry out its mandated tasks.In the absence of such consent, a peacekeeping operation risks becoming a party to the conflict and being drawn towards enforcement action, and away from its fundamental role of keeping the peace. b. Impartiality. Impartiality is crucial to maintaining the consent and cooperation of the main parties, but should not be confused with neutrality or inactivity. United Nations peacekeepers should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate.Just as a good referee is impartial, but will penalize infractions, so a peacekeeping operation should not condone actions by the parties that violate the undertakings of the peace process or the international norms and principles that a United Nations peacekeeping operation upholds. c. Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. UN peacekeeping operations are not an enforcement tool. However, they may use force at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, if acting in self-defence and defence of the mandate. In certain volatile situations, the Security Council has given UN peacekeeping operations robust mandates authorizing them to use all necessary means to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order. Although on the ground they may sometimes appear similar, robust peacekeeping should not be confused with peace enforcement, as envisaged under HYPERLINK http//www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/ Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the authorization of the Security Council and consent of the host nation and/or the main parties to the conflict. d. Resolution of the issue at hand. It is very important to ascertain that to what extent the UNPKO in a specific area has helped to resolve the issue at hand or to fulfil its mandate, as this will be the deciding factor in gauging the effectiveness of the operation. 14. Analysis of Case of east timor. The first years of independence were shaky. Australia sent a peacekeeping unit, followed by a U.N. force that grew to 1,600. Fighting among Timorese factions in 2006 required vigorous action by the peacekeepers to control. There was an assassination attempt against East Timors elected president in 2008. Nonetheless, the United Nations, including the peacekeepers, labored long and hard to train East Timors police to keep order and succeeded to the extent that the Timorese and others, including the heavily involved Australians, agreed that the U.N. peacekeepers could leave. There is no question that the U.N. presence helped a lot. No one would argue that East Timor could have reached the level of self-reliance it has now without the United Nations having played a constructive role. A look at East Timors history, characterized by resistance against the Portuguese, Japanese and Indonesians and eventually by infighting among its own people, argues that it could not establish nationhood easily, or certainly without external assistance. Thus, the country and its people should be commended. This success should encourage a U.N. role in achieving viability in other troubled states such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Liberia, Somalia and South Sudan. We can regard the case of east timor as a partial success story for UNPKO as it was the first time that the UN was given complete control of the state, yet It is todate considered as a successful sequential Peacekeeping operation achiving its principles of effectiveness. 15. Analysis of the case of DRC. The problems with the UN peacekeeping force in the DRC have been numerous since it onset in 1999. Among the challenges faced by MONUSCO to end violence in the DRC are holdups in funding contributions delays between the UNSCs authorization to deploy personnel and their actual deployment misdiagnosis of the conflicts roots the inability to come up with a suitable exit strategy and worse, lack of a common language and training methods. Unity of command and execution is often difficult to achieve in UN operations due to the diversity of the units and staff officers from all over the world. Tensions and clashes among the peacekeepers had some damaging effects in the DRC missions, and operations have been undermined by countries withdrawing support. The involvement of regional organizations such as the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) did not necessarily bring greater stability to the region. Lacking resources, experience, training, and impartiality (because of shared ethnic groups), these organizations do not yet have the capabilities necessary to engage in long-term, independent peacekeeping. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the peacekeeping strategies has been hampered by political divisions over the principles of peace operations. This resulted in their failure to properly demobilize some militias and integrate them into the national army as part of the political transition hence set the stage for further armed confrontations after the conflict had officially been declared to be over. Another MONUSCOs greatest shortcoming is the failure of the international community to fully understand the root causes of the conflict in the DRC. According to a report on the Conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo prepared by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the conflicts in the DRC have multiple causes revolving around four clusters of factors economic factors, institutional factors, regional factors and global geopolitical factors. In short, the difficulties of implementing peace building measures stem largely from the peacemakers failure to grasp fully the situation. At 1.35 billion per year spent by the UN to maintain this standing army, and the lack of change that it has produced in maintaining the peace order, the UN should reassess the purpose of their troops and the protection they are actually providing for the civilians. CONCLUSION 16. After the end of Second War Congo, the DRC has continued to experience conflicts and instability despite consistent efforts at the national, regional, and international levels to negotiate the end of wars and consolidate peace. Although peace deals have been signed, insecurity remains an issue, especially in the eastern region. This has also become a major cause of concern, as they pose a multi-dimensional challenge to economic and human development in the country and in the region. The UN peacekeeping mission has also made progress in areas such as countering armed militia groups and monitoring human rights violations, and continues to play an important role in protecting civilians. However, it also faces significant challenges political volatility as the electoral process unfolds ongoing rebel violence in the east of the country expanded responsibilities without resources to match inadequate political will from the DRC government to improve security and governance in the country. Yet we can consider the UNPKO in East Timor as a success story for the nation which although still is struggling to stand on its own feet after the long intervention of the foreign forces. RECOMMENDATIONS 17. Below are 5 reccomendations of reform areas on priority basis, each of which is in desperate need of change, and each of which will require member state support to achieve. Accomplishing even just some of the below would go a long way in making the UN system more effective a. Make high-impact management, human resources, and accountability changes. Certain administrative changes are critical if the United Nations is to maximize its potential. For starters, how the organization fills its senior-most positions needs serious attention. The United Nations can and should fill its senior ranks through merit-based appointments, and it can do this in a way that achieves gender parity and a balance of individuals from different regions. The organization should require that all Under- and Assistant-Secretary-General level positions be advertised, and the job announcements should list the duties and qualifications for the job and effectively increase the pool of qualified women candidates. The United Nations also needs to do a lot more to improve its culture of accountability and ensure that all UN staff adhere to the highest ethical standards and that wrong-doing is not tolerated even a small number of allegations of wrong-doing or retaliation against whistle blowers can undermine all of the organizations excellent work. One way to do this is to conduct independent audits of agency and senior manager performance, and more closely tie promotions and terminations with results. b. Transform the United Nations development and humanitarian assistance architectures. The UN development system must reprioritize its work to focus on implementing the Sustainable Development Goalswithinexisting budget resources. As part of this effort, the United Nations should eliminate duplication among its various entities, enhance partnerships with the private sector and civil society, and improve transparency and accountability by publishing data and performance results online. The organization also must improve coherence among development and humanitarian assistance efforts to respond more effectively to protracted and recurrent crises and enhance emergency prevention and preparedness efforts. The world now has more forcibly displaced people than at any time since the Second World War. Former Secretary-General Ban convened the first World Humanitarian Summit last year to establish an ambitious reform agenda for creating a more strategic and effective humanitarian response system to, among other objectives, address this unprecedented displacement. c. Continue badly needed peacekeeping reforms. There are over 100,000 UN peacekeepers deployed in around the world. These brave men and women are on the frontlines of protecting civilians and contributing to sustainable peace, often in austere environments and with insufficient equipment and training. The United Nations and its member states have not done enough to improve the design and capabilities of these operations. Lastly, and perhaps most important, senior UN leadership in New York, mission leaders in the field, and individual units need to be held accountable more uniformly for failure to carry out their mandated tasks and for conduct and discipline issues, particularly sexual exploitation and abuse of the very people UN peacekeepers are supposed to protect. d. Strengthen the United Nations conflict prevention, mediation, and peacebuilding capabilities. While UN peacekeeping missions are critical tools in the maintenance of international peace and security, they are expensive and should not be treated as substitutes for long-term solutions (as, unfortunately, some of them have become). The United Nations efforts to prevent conflict through analysis and early warning, mediation, and peacebuilding are equally important to global peace and security efforts. Efforts to address these deficiencies over the years too often have been met with resistance by some member states who see funding in support of these lines of effort as taking away from funding in support of development and other needs, leading to stalemates in UN budget discussions that hamper the organizations ability to be effective. e. Create a high-level UN coordinator for counterterrorism and countering violent extremism. The United Nations has made strides over the past decade in ramping up its counterterrorism and countering violent extremism work. But this has resulted in 37 entities across the UN system focused on these issues, with no single focal point to coordinate activities, shift resources, or plan strategically. The United Nations needs to create an Under-Secretary-General position to provide dedicated leadership on coordinating and implementing the organizations work to counter terrorism and violent extremism. Making the UN system more efficient and effective on these issues is critical to building member states capacities to counter todays threats and prevent future ones from emerging.Like any great organization, the United Nations must continually analyze its performance and make structural and operational changes to improve its results.. ( 4994 words) July 2018 MUHAMMAD NAUMAN RAFIQ Maj Student (PAKISTAN ARMY) Katharina P. Coleman. The Dynamics of Peacekeeping Budget Cuts The Case of MONUSCO. Report from International PEACE Institute (July 10, 2017). Retrieved from URL HYPERLINK https//reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dynamics-peacekeeping-budget-cuts-case-monusco https//reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/dynamics-peacekeeping-budget-cuts-case-monusco (Accessed on February 20, 2018) PAUL DIEHL published in 1988 Republic of Congo ONUC. Retrieved from URL HYPERLINK https//peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/onucB.htm https//peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/onucB.htm (Accessed on February 20, 2018) Rwanda How the genocide happened. BBC News (17 May 2011). Retrieved from URL HYPERLINK http//www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13431486 http//www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13431486 (Accessed on February 20, 2018) Prunier, Grard (1999). HYPERLINK https//books.google.com/booksidO3aNPwAACAAJ The Rwanda Crisis History of a Genocide(2nd ed.). Kampala Fountain Publishers Limited. HYPERLINK https//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Number o International Standard Book Number ISBN HYPERLINK https//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SpecialBookSources/978-9970-02-089-8 o SpecialBookSources/978-9970-02-089-8 978-9970-02-089-8. Mollie Zapata. A brief history of Congos wars. November 29, 2011. Retrieved from URL HYPERLINK https//www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2011/1129/A-brief-history-of-Congo-s-wars https//www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2011/1129/A-brief-history-of-Congo-s-wars (Accessed on February 20, 2018) DR Congo Swears In Transitional Government Ministers. Global Policy Forum (July 15, 2003). Retrieved from URL HYPERLINK https//www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/181/33544.html https//www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/181/33544.html (Accessed on February 20, 2018) Ceasefire Agreement (Lusaka Agreement). UN Peacemaker. Retrieved from URL HYPERLINK https//peacemaker.un.org/drc-lusaka-agreement99 https//peacemaker.un.org/drc-lusaka-agreement99 (Accessed on February 20, 2018) United Nations Organization Mission inthe Democratic Republic of the Congo- MONUC. Retrieved from URL HYPERLINK https//peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/monuc/ https//peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/monuc/ (Accessed on February 20, 2018) About MONUSCO. Retrieved from URL HYPERLINK https//monusco.unmissions.org/en/about https//monusco.unmissions.org/en/about (Accessed on February 20, 2018) Problematic Peacekeeping in the DRC From MONUC to MONUSCO. Global Policy Forum (Fen 4, 2013). Retrieved from URL HYPERLINK https//www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/democratic-republic-of-congo/52244-problematic-peacekeeping-in-the-drc-from-monuc-to-monusco.html https//www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/democratic-republic-of-congo/52244-problematic-peacekeeping-in-the-drc-from-monuc-to-monusco.html (Accessed on February 20, 2018) Conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo Causes, impact and implications for the Great Lakes region. 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